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Summary findings
In  1995-96,  Mexico  shifted  to a multipillar  approach  to  component,  and  the moral  hazard  implications  of the
old-age  security.  The  objective  of  the publicly  managed  lifetime-switch  option.  But Mexico  achieved  radical
first  pillar  is redistribution;  a fully-funded  second  pillar  reform  with  its pension  system  within  a difficult  political
provides  for  mandatory  individual  savings  accounts  and  and  economic  environment.
competitive  but  exclusive  and  specialized  pension  fund  And  the timing  of reform  was appropriate.  The  age
management;  the  third  pillar  is voluntary  savings.  structure  in the  existing  system  is very  young,  so
This  package  could  provide  effective  income  security  coverage  could  increase.  Also,  reform  took  place  after
and  protection  against  old-age  poverty,  in a manner  the  inflationary  1980s  and  the  recent  financial  crisis,
compatible  with  goals  of savings  and  economic  growth.  which  eroded  the  real  value  of  old  pensions,  the  acquired
It offers  Mexico's  first  real  opportunity  to shift  to a  pension  rights  of the  transition  generation,  and the
defined-contribution  model  and  to expand  and  deepen  minimum  pension  for  minimum-wage  retirees.
domestic  capital  markets  by creating  a new  class of  If returns  on  invested  contributions  are  high  enough,
institutional  investors  - although  in the short  term  its  much  of the transition  generation  will  choose  the
impact  on capital  markets  will be limited  by the  need  to  defined-contribution  alternative  over  the  old  pay-as-you-
focus  on  the security  of pension  fund  investments.  go system.  This  will  release  the  government  from
The  reformed  system  provides  for  a probably  pension  liabilities,  except  for  the  minimum  pension
irreversible  shift toward  private  intermediation  of most  guarantee  for  new  affiliates.
domestic  investment  funds,  Further  efforts  to improve  Ensuring  the  system's  long-term  success  will require
the  pension  system  should  encourage  efficiency,  improved  financial  performance  from  INFONAVIT,  the
confidence,  and  economies  of scale.  authorities'  political  will and  technical  ability  to  enforce
There  are weaknesses  in Mexico's  pension  design  - pension  laws and  regulations,  and  the  system's  flexibility
especially  the  limited  scope  for  workers  in the  private  in the face  of changing  circumstances.
sector,  the continued  role  of the housing-fund
This paper  - a product  of the Finance,  Private  Sector,  and Infrastructure  Unit,  Latin America  and  the Caribbean  Regional
Office  - is part  of  a larger  effort  to  study  contractual  savings  development  in Latin  America.  Copies  of  the  paper  are
available  free from  the World  Bank,  1818  H  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  Please contact  Cara  Zappala,  room  IS-
074,  telephone  202-458-7945,  fax 202-522-2106,  Internet  address  czappala@worldbank.org.  Gloria  Grandolini  may  be
contacted  at  ggrandolini@worldbank.org.  June  1998.  (43  pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work  in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not  necessarily  represent the view of  the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
Produced  by the Policy  Research  Dissemination  CenterTHE 1997 PENSION  REFORM  IN MEXICO
by
Gloria Grandolini (World Bank)
and
Luis Cerda (Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico)
The views presented in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the opinions
of the institutions  with which  they are affiliated. This paper includes  contributions  and suggestions  by
Carlos  Noriega,  Fernando  Solis,  Jose Maria Rivera,  Rafael Trava,  Marcela  Abraham,  Gabriel  Martinez,
Eduardo Gonzalez, Carlos Soto, Enrique Davila, John Stein, Mike Lubrano, Tom Glaessner, Hemant
Shah, Dimitri Vittas, Estelle James, Ulpiano Ayala, Steve Weisbrod, and Truman Packard.Mexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION  3
I. MEXICO'S TRADITIONAL PAYG SYSTEM: FEATURES AND NEED FOR REFORM_  3
The Pension  System  Before  1997  3
The Rationale  for Pension  Reform  5
II. THE  1992  SAR EXPERIENCE:  HOW  PENSION  REFORM  SHOULD  NOT  BE DONE  8
The Second  Pillar:  Individual  Retirement  Accounts  in the  SAR  8
Lessons  from the SAR Experience  9
-II.  THE  1997 PENSION  REFORM  1  11
Context  for Reform  11
Private  Management  of Retirement,  Old Age and  Severance  Funds  12
The Rules  of Pension  Fund  Administration_  14
Disability  and Life: IMSS  and Insurance  Companies  Living  Together  _19
Looking  South  19
IV. ESTIMATION OF THE FISCAL COSTS OF THE REFORM  20
What  is the Bill? A Summary  of Results  20
Fiscal  Costs:  Assumptions  and Scenario  Analysis  24
V. KEY  CHALLENGES  TO THE  REFORMED  SYSTEM  32
Correcting  Design Issues  32
Confronting  Implementation  Challenges_  36
CONCLUSIONS  40
BIBLIOGRAPHY  41Mexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  3
INTRODUCTION
This paper presents an analysis of the Mexican reform as a case study of the pension reforms
taking place in Latin America.  The goal is to provide insights into the rationale of the reform and
attempt to identify problems tha.: might arise during the implementatic.  of the new pension scheme.
Demographic changes, health costs, as well as an increased level of benefits not properly backed in
sufficient actuarial reserves indicated that the public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system operating
in Mexico, would become financially unsustainable by the end of the decade.  A limited and failed
attempt at reform was made in 1992 by establishing a mandatory individual retirement savings account
and by raising the contribution quota to the Mexican Social Security Institute (Instituto Mexicano de
Seguridad Social - IMSS) to cover increasing financial requirements.  This was done with the levying
of a higher pay-roll tax that encouraged evasion among workers and employers.
The IMSS  worsening  financial  situation,  labor market  distortions,  unfairness  linked  to  the
benefits'  scheme, and the need to generate higher domestic  savings led to  a growing consensus for
pension reform in Mexico.  In December 1995, the Mexican Congress approved legislation to reform
the existing social security law and shift the pension system for workers in the formal private sector to
a privately managed defined-contribution system.  Congress approved a second legislative package on
the implementation of the reforms in April 1996.
The Mexican design is based on a multipillar approach to old age security.  Fundamentally, the
reformed scheme consists of a publicly managed first pillar  with a redistributive objective, a fully-
funded second pillar with mandatory individual savings accounts and competitive but exclusive and
specialized pension fund management, and a third pillar consisting of voluntary savings.  The reform
went into effect on September 1, 1997, it covers approximately 11.5 million private sector workers and
it is estimated that approximately US$4.0 billion will flow into the system annually.
The paper is organized into five sections that discuss: (i) the initial conditions of the public
pension system and the forces driving the Mexican reform, including the need, timing, and context for
reform; (ii) lessons from the  1992 Retirement Savings System (Sistema de Ahorro para  el Retiro -
SAR) experience; (iii)  the characteristics of the  1997 reform,  including comparisons with  pension
reforms in other Latin American countries and the legal, regulatory, and supervisory framework for
fund administration; (iv) the results of the estimation of the fiscal costs of transition; and (v) the key
challenges to the reformed system.
I.  MEXICO'S  TRADITIONAL PAYG SYSTEM:  FEATURES  AND NEED FOR REFORM
The Pension System before 1997
Since 1944 the IMSS has managed, among others, the old age, severance, disability and life
insurance (Invalidez,  Vejez, Cesantia en Edad Avanzada, y  Muerte - IVCM). The IMSS is the largest
institution in Mexico providing social security to the population.  The total number of affiliates to the
IMSS is around  11  million and all affiliates are private sector workers (Table I).
The Mexican social security system for formal private sector workers and the self-employed as
it evolved for almost fifty years through 1992 consisted essentially of two elements of support:
retirement,  pensioners'  health  benefits,  and  disability  pensions  (IVCM)  based  on  payroll
contributions of 8.5 % of wages for formal private sector workers administered by IMSS; andMexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  4
additional retirement  income from  contributions to  a  specialized  housing fund  based on  an
employer-paid contribution of 5 % of wages for private sector employees administered by the
National Workers' Housing Fund Institute (Instituto del Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda de los
Trabajadores -INFONAVIT).
Originally, the IMSS's  pension program was designed to be  a collective fund financed from
contributions from workers, employers and the state.  The original IMSS-IVCM can be characterized
as a partially-funded defined benefit scheme.  However, since the very  beginning, it operated  as a
PAYG scheme as the fund's actuarial reserves were used to finance other social insurance activities,
particularly health.  Until the 1970s there were no actuarial reserves to face pension liabilities. This
was possible  because a stable macroeconomic  situation and  a  young population  generated  enough
resources to finance current pension liabilities and at the same time finance health requirements.
Formnal  19.8  59.1
Informnal  13.7  40.9
TOTAL  33.5  100
~NINUNi  111>KYw:i111i  1  ,
Public Sector Schemes  1.4  11.4
ISSSTE, States, and Armed Forces (a)  1.3  10.6
PEMEX (b)  0.1  0.8
Total Covered  12.3  100
Not Covered  21.2
Self-employed or underemployed  19.5
Unemployed  1.7
Sources: IMSS, PEMEX, and Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, 1995.
(a) Institute for Security and Social Services for Government Workers (Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los
Trabajadores del Estado)
(b) The State-owned petroleum company (Petr6leos Mexicanos)
To receive disability benefits, a worker had to contribute to the IVCM system for at least 150
weeks.  Despite the existence of a formal process for reviewing disability requests, a striking fact is
that 30% of current pensioners are receiving disability pensions.  To be entitled to receive an old age
pension, the insured was required to be 65 years old, be  currently working and have contributed a
minimum of 500 weeks.  The same conditions applied for severance but the minimum age was 60
years.  In case of death, the survivor's pension is paid to the widow and/or dependents, or, in case they
do not exist, to the contributor's parents.  The insured had to contribute at least 150 weeks.
The system contained a guaranteed minimum pension equal to the minimum wage.  To address
the erosion of the real value of pensions, in 1989 pensions were indexed to changes in the minimum
wage.  At  least  500 weeks  of  contributions were  necessary to  qualify for  the minimum  pension.
Pensions are paid according  to  a  formula contained in  the old  Social Security  Law  which  favors
workers at the bottom of the wage scale.  The pension base is calculated as a percentage of the average
wage in nominal terms for the last 5 years, plus a fraction for each year of contribution in excess of 10.Mexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  5
As wages are higher, the percentage of the pension base is reduced.  Pensions may never be higher than
the average wage a worker received during the previous 5 contributing years.
The old PAYG system appeared to be quite effective in redistributing income to  low-income
affiliates. However, as in many other theoretically redistributive PAYG systems, there is a considerable
difference between promised and actual redistribution (Friedman,  1996; Schmidt-Hebbel, 1994; and
World Bank, 1994). In the Mexican case, as a result of the eligibility requirements (10 years vesting
period) and the benefit formula, the system was in fact favoring particular groups of affiliates, which
were not necessarily in the lower income brackets.  This perverse redistributive effect is related to:
*  The eligibility requirements.  To receive a retirement pension, workers had to accumulate at least
500 weeks of contributions (equivalent to 10 years).  Women and other affiliates with high rotation
could loose all rights to a pension.  The redistribution then would go from those workers working
less than 10 years to those working 10 years or more.  Also, high-income workers who in economic
terms contributed less than low-income workers could still receive a much higher pension.  This
could happen if the rich worker contributed only for the minimum of 10 years, while a low-income
worker contributed for more than 20 years.
*  The structure of the benefits and contributions.  The benefit formula in the old PAYG system  allowed
those people who worked for more than 10 years to receive relatively higher pensions.  However,
there were incentives for some workers to either work for only 10 years (since the largest part of a
pension would be gained by only working this minimum time), or to belong to the formal sector for
only  the minimum  of  10 years.  In  these  cases,  workers with  longer periods  of  contribution
subsidized workers contributing for only the minimum period required, regardless of their income.
The benefit formula also created incentives to under-report income, allowing high-income workers
to  contribute the same as  some low-income workers, and upon retirement, to  receive the same
pension.
The Rationale for Pension Reform
Beginning in the early 1  990s, a consensus began to develop that the social security system, and
in particular the IMSS system, needed to be reformed.  A long debate ensued on the options for reform
and the depth of the measures to be implemented.  The three critical reasons for pension reform were
that despite the relatively young population (nearly half is under the age of 25) the Mexican pension
system was plagued by financial disequilibrium, inadequate pensions, and high evasion. These factors
are  the  most  common  instigators  of  pension  reform  throughout  the  developing  world  where
populations are still young, public PAYG system finances are on a downward trend, and informality
and  poverty  are widespread  (World Bank,  1994; James,  1996; and  Demirguc-Kunt  and  Schwarz,
1996).
Demographic Trends: Avoiding Future Shocks and Taking Advantage of Present Opportunities
In 1960, Mexico's  population structure was relatively young.  Of 35 million inhabitants, only
5.6% were older than 60 years, while 55% of the total population was below 20 years of age (Figure
1  a).  Over the  next  several  decades  Mexico's  population  structure  began  to  shift  as  the  rate  of
population  growth  decreased  and  life  expectancy  began to  rise  (Figure  lb).  By  1990, Mexico's
population had more than doubled at more than 81 million inhabitants.Mexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  6
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Although Mexico's  population pyramid continued to show an important share of young people,
lower population  growth and mortality  rates have resulted in  a  rapid aging of  IMSS contributors.
These changes in population dynamics have lead to an increasing dependency ratio in IMSS.  In 1960,
there were four pensioners per one hundred contributors.  By 1994 this ratio had increased to  12.5 to
one hundred. The expected average annual rate of growth in the number of pensioners will be 5.7% for
the next 20 years, while the most optimistic forecast for growth of contributors will be around 2.6%.
Concomitantly, life expectancy after 65 years has increased. Therefore, benefits after retirement will be
greater in the coming years further deteriorating IMSS' financial situation.
The positive implication of these trends is that Mexico, like many developing countries, has the
distinct  advantage of  initiating reform at a  time when  its  demographic profile  is relatively  young,
making the transition more affordable:Mexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  7
*  the majority of the Mexican population is still young - in 1990 only 6.4 % of the population was
above 65  (Figure la);
*  rapid growth in  aging as a  result of lower  fertility rates and  improvements in  life expectancy
(Figure lb) which will result in 10.4 % of the population above 65 years of age by 2020;
*  a sharp increase in the dependency ratio;  in  1960 there were four pensioners per one hundred
contributors, by 1994 this ratio increased to 12.5 per one hundred pensioners (Figure Ic); and
*  Mexico's  current demographic structure limits the fiscal costs of pension reform.  In 1994 almost
50 % of IMSS contributors were between 15 and 30 years old, while the peak of the average wage
distribution is reached at about age 40 (Figure ld); this implies that wages for the 15 to 30 year old
population will increase in time enabling them to acquire a pension higher than the minimum.
IMSS: Heading toward Bankruptcy
Financial Disequilibrium.  Severe financial disequilibrium was the most pressing reason why
pension reform could not wait.  Based on various measurement methods, the overall financial condition
of the pension system would have reached crisis proportions soon.  As mentioned earlier, the surplus
generated by the pension program has been used to finance infrastructure requirements of IMSS and to
partially finance health and maternity insurance, which has been traditionally in deficit. In fact, pension
reserves were not constituted until  1960, 16 years after the establishment of IMSS.  In summary, the
level of actuarial reserves was not enough to  finance the net present value associated with an aging
population and increasing evasion.
Current contributions were insufficient in the medium  and long term to  finance increasingly
generous benefits that had been extended to workers and their relatives. Originally, the system covered
only  the  worker  and  not  his  family  and  benefits  were  defined  as  fixed  nominal  quantities. The
minimum pension increased from 35% of the minimum wage prior to 1989 to 100  O  in 1995.  In other
words, the IMSS changed the benefit structure 40 times between 1943 and 1995, while the structure of
contributions changed only three times during the same period.
Table 2. IMSS-IVCM  Present  Value of Future  Pension  Deficits  (as of 12/31/94)
1994 NP$1000 million
|  - - - *  U'A  sm  s 
|  , ......  ....  :  - i  ...:.:.  .'..  ........  '':''.::5-'  . ...............  ..  im  h  ."
Reserves  3.25  Present value of old  96.93
pensions
Present value of future  683.67  Present  value of future  2,390.61
contributions  liabilities
Actual affiliates  179.74  This generation  1,017.40
Future generations  503.93  Future generations  1,373.21
TOTAL  ASSETS  683.92  TOTAL  LIABILITIES  2,487.54
Source: IMSS.
Financial  pressures from  an unfair  system.  During the  1970s and  the  1980s, pensions
decreased sharply in terms of their real value, thus affecting pensioners'  real income. This issue was
partially corrected in  1989 by indexing pensions to  minimum wages.  As a consequence, a funding
problem arose for IMSS since pensions that were financed with current contributions were periodicallyMexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  8
increased.  This led to an increasing asset-liability mismatch.  According to Government calculations,
IMSS'  actuarial deficit (141 % of 1994 GDP in present value and for a time horizon of 75 years) was
expected to result in a cash deficit by the year 2007.  This would have required either a trebling  of
contributions or an increase in Government contributions amounting to  1% of GDP in the year 2000
and 3.75% of GDP in the year 2030.
Evasion, Inequality, and Poverty
In the PAYG system, high rates of evasion are associated with three main factors: the weak
relationship between contributions and benefits, high  inflation, and  short vesting  periods.  There  is
almost  no  relation  between  benefits  and  lifetime  contributions,  which  encourages  evasion,
underreporting of wages and informality in the labor market. First, on average, the IMSS pays each
insured worker a pension for a period of 18 years and the corresponding widow's pension for 12 more
years. Together, this amounts to an equivalent pension of 30 years while in some cases the worker may
have contributed to the system for only 10 years, the required vesting period.  After only 10 years of
contributing as little as 4% of wages, a worker becomes eligible to receive a stream of benefits equal to
17 years at not less than 100% of the minimum wage, and up to 100% of the average salary of the last
5 years. If the affiliate leaves the formal work force before pensioning, he can loose all his rights for
pensioning and years of contributions unless he returns and contributes again for a year.
Second, the reference base salary to calculate the pension is based on the average of the wages
earned in the last five years divided by the current minimum wage and not on the earnings for all years
of service.  Third, indexation of benefits to the minimum wage (rather than the general price index)
introduces political  risk via lags  in the adjustment of  the minimum wage  in times  of accelerating
inflation. Moreover, this indexation scheme penalizes a government that adopts tough anti-inflationary
policies since minimum wages can increase in real terms and result in large increases in public pension
obligations. These types of problems have been documented in other countries (See Valdes, 1994 and
World Bank,1994).  The high inflation of the 1980s led to a significant drop in real wages, which fell
by 60% between 1980 and 1994.  Contributions to the IVCM system began to tail off with the fall in
real wages and the real value of pensions eroded.  In most cases (80% of pensioners), this has reduced
pensions  to  the  guaranteed  minimum  benefit,  which  is  equivalent  to  the  minimum  wage
(approximately US$90 per month).
Not surprisingly, workers have perceived the pension scheme as a payroll tax.  This situation
has created strong incentives for both employers and employees to avoid affiliation and under-report
earnings to qualify, and over-report them to receive benefits.  It has also acted as a deterrent to attract
informal sector workers, who comprise mainly the poor.
II. THE 1992 SAR REFORM:  HOW A PENSION REFORM SHOULD NOT BE DONE
The Second Pillar: Individual Retirement Accounts in the SAR
In a partial effort to address growing deficiencies in the first pillar, the Government introduced
the SAR in May 1992 as a mandatory fully funded savings scheme based on individual accounts.  It
was designed to complement the first pillar' and consisted of two sub-accounts:
IWhile there are  as  many  as  8,000  voluntary  occupational  plans, most  of these  funds are  concentrated  in 30  to  35
enterprises - foreign multinationals and the large parastatals - and combine a severance payment obligation (defined underMexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  9
*  a new mandatory 2% employer contribution on wages paid to private and public sector employees
channeled into individual retirement sub-accounts.  These funds are channeled to the Central Bank
through the commercial banking system.  The Central Bank guarantees a real rate of return of at
least  2%  on these  retirement  sub-accounts which  by  end-1995  totaled  about US$  2.9 billion
invested in Government securities; and
*  a specialized housing sub-account managed by INFONAVIT.  Although the contribution remained
at 5%  of wages,  INFONAVIT's  benefit  provision  was  changed to  accumulated  balances  (i.e.,
accumulated contributions plus a real return on these) as opposed to only nominal  accumulated
contributions.  The  Banco  de  Mexico  transfers  the  resources  of  the  housing  subaccount  to
INFONAVIT.  The  institute  would  pay  interests  according  to  the  operational  surplus  for  the
corresponding year.
Table 3 summarizes overall pre-reform social security contributions for workers in the private
sector, including health insurance, professional risks insurance and childcare.
Table 3: Social Security Contributions as Percentage of Payroll
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Lessonsfrom  the SAR Experience
Substantial  institutional  and  conceptual problems  led to  the  failure  of  this  first  attempt  to
develop a complementary pension scheme to supplement the system's first pillar. The SAR's problems
quickly discredited it arnong the population.
Slow progress and final failure of the SAR, can be attributed to:
lack of any consistent supervision of accounts held by commercial banks and the lack of a final
regulatory framework for  investment managers. The regulatory agency - the National Commission
for the Retirement  Saving System (Comision Nacional de Sistemas de Ahorro para  el Retiro -
CONSAR) - was established in July of 1994, two years after the SAR began operations;
Labor Law Article 165 as 90 days of minimum daily salary for each year of service) with either defined-benefit or defined-
contribution schemes.  Affiliation to the third pillar cannot substitute for affiliation to other pillars.Mexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  10
*  management problems,  including frequent management turn-over and insufficient attention to the
program's technical details and operating characteristics;
*  poor accounting, coordination, and monitoring due to the lack of a single organization responsible
for SAR  operations. This  has caused problems  in  the collection  of  SAR  contributions,  in  the
reconciliation  of  amounts received, and  in  the settlement  of  the  accounts administered  by  the
commercial banks, the Central Bank, and the social security or housing institutions;
*  multiple identification numbers for individual contributors as a result of the use of "RFC" numbers
(Taxpayers Federal Registration Code). Duplicate accounts at banks have risen to almost half of the
20 million accounts now registered. Multiple RFC's have been generated by employers, workers,
and even banks.  Moreover,  since employees did not choose where to open their accounts, many of
them ignore in which banks they have an account;
*  poor  account administration  and  collection functions  by commercial  banks, due  largely  to the
disincentives to banks brought by low commission ceilings and the small size of SAR accounts.
Banks joined the SAR in  1992 under political pressures so they have relatively little incentive to
provide these  services satisfactorily, particularly to  smaller  firms  with  fewer employees.  This
problem  has  been  compounded  by  the  incentive  for  commercial  banks  to  maintain  good
relationships with corporate clients rather than enforce adequate collection of SAR contributions;
*  extremely high concentration of accounts with 75% of the accounts held in 3 Mexican banks; and
*  INFONA VIT's financial performance  is seriously affected by the following problems which were
not addressed by the 1992 reform:  42% of workers who received a housing credit have 12 or more
delinquent monthly payments; INFONAVIT's personnel is excessive relative to its functions; and
since workers do not have a single ID number INFONAVIT's  capacity to collect credits is very
limited.  Table 4 highlights the negative rates of return in housing investments that INFONAVIT
has given to workers between 1993 and 1995.
Table 4:  SAR Balances - Private Sector Workers  The 1992 SAR exemplifies how a
pension reform should not be done.
Accumulated  Balauc  The SAR will be remembered as a
(million{33tg3  pesos)  frustrated effort  at  buildng  a
Period  Retirement  Housing  second  pillar.  Nevertheless,  the
Dec. 1993  5,178  8,699  SAR  experience  contains  lessons
Dec. 1994  9,009  15,178  for the  1997 reform as well as for
Dec. 1995  17,616  22,293  other  reformers  that  are  studying
Dec. 1996  28,153  37,115  alternatives  for  substituting  or
Nov 1997  a/  37,850  56,283  complementing  PAYG  pension
Source: CONSAR and INFONAVIT  systems.  The  policy  makers
a. Nov. 1997 exchange rate was 8 pesos per US$1.  responsible for the 1992 reform:
*  did not focus on the implementation of the system after the legislation was approved and created a
regulatory agency only after two years of implementation;
. used political pressures to force banks into individual account record-keeping, controlled fees and
canceled banks'  profit maximization decisions upon entering (and leaving) the SAR; did not care
about a proper ID number for workers and trusted existing codes plagued with problems;
*  created individual  accounts but  the  owners were not  allowed to  choose  the  account  managers.
Instead, they put the decision in employers'  hands and simply replicated banking concentration in
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*  underestimated  the need for an investment regime  and  left all savings in  Banco de  Mexico for
financing public expenditure. Moreover, no action was taken to improve INFONAVIT's  financial
performance.  An opportunity to deepen financial markets was lost and the SAR was increasingly
perceived  as just another tax.
Finally,  an  important consideration  for  the  consolidation  of  a  second  pillar  scheme  is  an
appropriate definition of property rights.  In the case of the SAR, three problems were present from the
beginning of the scheme.  First,  a multiplicity of accounts obscured transparency in the management
of each individual account.  Second, individual contributions went to the Government as a direct loan
and workers did not have control on investment decision-making.  Finally, employers had  decision-
making power on account individualization and management.
The 1997 reform eliminates the SAR scheme.  The retirement sub-account is integrated to the
new old age and  severance insurance  sub-account, whereas the housing  sub-account  is maintained
separate.  Beginning  on  September  1,  1997 no  more contributions  were  made  into  the  old  SAR
accounts.  Under the reformed system, workers have the right to collect their SAR 92-8/97 balances in
a single payment upon retirement.
1II. THE 1997 PENSION REFORM
Context  for Reform
Reforming pension systems is very complex because of their multi-dimensional nature and their
links with fiscal and tax policy, labor markets, the health sector, the insurance sector, and  financial
markets in general (Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1994; Vittas, 1992). Particularly in Mexico, the design
of a pension reform had to address difficult political economy issues relating to labor policies and legal
issues relating to the constitutional rights of pensioners.  These considerations were very important in
weighing  policy  options  for  reform  of  the  first  pillar's  benefit  provisions  because  the  Mexican
Constitution  safeguards acquired  rights  of  pensioners to  certain benefits  and  services provided  by
IMSS.  It is important to note that both accumulated benefits and expectations of benefits are protected.
Moreover,  the  reform  had  to  be  designed  within  the  framework of  a  weakened  financial  sector
following the  1994 crisis.  Finally,  there were important considerations relating to  the macro-fiscal
effects of different reform options.
The fragile political environment in which the executive branch has had to operate compounded
these  problems.  Splits  within  the  ruling  Partido  Revolucionario  Institucional  (PRI),  as  well  as
opposition from the other political parties and labor unions,  have prevented  the Government from
embracing a broader reform of pensions for public employees as well as providing for a broader reform
of IMSS.  In the course of events, for the first time, Congress has introduced substantive amendments
to legislation proposed by the executive branch, the most important of which had to do with IMSS'
continued role in the collection  and pension payment process,  and the explicit legal prohibition  on
investment in foreign securities.
Along the lines of recent pension reform programs, the Mexican design is based on a multipillar
approach  to  old  age  security  (World  Bank,  1994  and  Arrau  and  Schmidt-Hebbel,  1994).
Fundamentally, the reformed scheme consists of a publicly managed first pillar with a redistributive
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income  workers,  a  fully-funded  second  pillar  with  mandatory  individual  savings  accounts  and
competitive, but exclusive and specialized, mutual  fund management, and a third pillar consisting of
voluntary savings.
In December 1995 the Mexican Congress approved legislation (the new Social security law -
Ley  del  Seguro  Social)  establishing  the  new  system.  A  second  legislative  package  on  the
implementation of the reforms (the Pension  Systems Law - Ley de los Sistemas de Ahorro para  el
Retiro) was enacted in April  1996.  Legislation was also approved in December  1996 to  make the
legislative framework for the housing scheme consistent with the new pension system.  The reformed
pension system: eliminates the old PAYG scheme; provides current IMSS affiliates with a choice at
retirement between the benefits under  the old  system or their accumulated balances  under the new
system; provides a  government-guaranteed minimum pension  for those  low-income workers whose
savings are insufficient to provide a post retirement income at that level; and eliminates cross subsidies
among IMSS insurance branches.
The IVCM  system is separated under the reform into the Old Age and  Severance insurance
(RCV - Seguro de Retiro, Cesantia en Edad Avanzada, y  Vejez), the Disability and Life Insurance (IV -
Seguro de Invalidez y  Vida), and the Medical Expenses for Pensioners insurance (Gastos Medicos de
Pensionados).  The reform began on July  1, 1997 for voluntary contributions  and on September  1,
1997 for mandatory contributions.  Table 5 summarizes the main differences between the old IVCM
system and the new reformed system.
Private Managementfor  the Retirement, Old Age and Severance Funds
Individual retirement funds (SIEFORES - Sociedades de Inversi6n Especializadas en Fondos
para el Retiro) constitute the backbone of the new fully-funded pension system.  The SIEFORES will
be administered by investment management firms (AFORES - Administradores de Fondos de Ahorro
para  el Retiro) to be established by the private  sector, IMSS, and trade unions.  In addition to  the
option for IMSS  to  establish a  single AFORE,  it will  continue to  be:  (i) the legal  enforcer of  all
contributions  and collections; (ii) the provider of benefits to existing pensioners;  (iii) responsible for
delivering benefits to transition workers choosing the old PAYG system upon retirement; and (iv) the
provider of the minimum pension guarantee to private sector workers.
Contributions to the new system became compulsory for all private sector workers beginning in
September,  1997.  The retirement age remains at 65 years.  The years of contributions required to be
eligible for the minimum pension guarantee (MPG) are raised from 10 to 25 years.  Under the reform,
each worker's  individual retirement account is composed of two compulsory sub-accounts, the RCV
sub-account managed by the AFORES, and the INFONAVIT sub-account.  Workers have a third sub-
account  for  voluntary  contributions.  Workers'  contributions  are  automatically  passed  on  to  the
designated AFORES.Mexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  13
Table 5: Mexico - Comparison of PAYG and Reformed Old Age Security Systems
- ~~~~~~~Myt~  9XF;w317RcV+  W.  SyH*-B  1stem.
OldAge  and Severance (RCV)  IMSS  * Contributions  to  chosen  pension  fund  administrator
(AFORE)
l Benefits provided by AFORES  if new system, or IMSS
if  old  PAYG  system  chosen at  retirement (Transition
generation only)
Disability  and Life  Insurance  IMSS  IMSS
B.COA?TRIREITIONS~~~~~~~  15.5  16.5  -21.  0 (average  1  7.  5)
Old age and  severance  (RCV)  11.0  12.5-17.0  (=11.5  +  social  quota):  13.5 average  worker
Disability and life (IV)  4.5  4.0
Detailed breakdown:  IVCM (to IMSS):  8.5  RCV Individual Accounts:
Old age and severance  3.0  to AFORES:  6.5b+Social Quota
Disability and death  3.0  Old age and severance  4.5
Reserves for pensioners' health  1.5  Retirement sub-account  2.0
Administration expenses  0.6  Social quota (per day)  5.5% of I MWC
Social Assistance  0.4  to INFONAVIT:  5.0
SAR-Retirement (to Central Bank):  2.0  IV to IMSS:  4.0
SAR Housing (to INFONAVIT):  5.0  - Disability and life  2.5
Reserves for pensioners' health  1.5
Old Age  500 weeks (10 years) and 65 years old  1,250 weeks (25 years) and 65 years old
Severance  500 weeks and 60 years old  1,250 weeks and 60 years old
Disability Insurance  150 weeks, inability to earn 50% of salary  250 weeks
Life Insurance  150 weeks  250 weeks
IXBEYEFnl  s 
Old Age: Amount ofpension  (i) benefits accrued under PAYG system  New workers:  accumulated balances in individual
(a % of the average wage of last 5 years in  accounts (AFORES + INFONAVIT) since 9/1/1997;
nominal terms plus a fraction for each year in  Transition workers: at retirement choose highest
excess of 10, with a maximum of the above  between: (i) current benefits (see previous column) and (ii)
mentioned average wage; indexed to changes  accumulated balances in individual accounts (AFORES +
in minimum wage).  +  INFONAVIT) since 9/1/1997 + retirement sub-account
(ii) accumulated INFONAVIT contributions  accumulated  balances 5/92-8/97 (if still in Central Bank)
(iii) retirement sub-account 5/92-8/97
OldAge:  Withdrawals d  *  Gradual withdrawals from individual account in the
AFORE, e or
*  Annuity bought  from an insurance company
Disability Insurance: Amount  Depends on degree of disability.  Provided  *  Degree of disability still determined by IMSS.
ofpension  by IMSS: a % of the average wage of last 5  *  Pension provided by private insurance companies:
years in nominal terms plus a fraction for  35% of average wage (in real terms) for the last 500
each year in excess of 10, with a maximum  weeks of contributions
of  the above mentioned average wage.
Life Insurance: Amount of  Widow: 90% of disability pension;
pension  Dependents: 20% of disability pension, or
30% if both parents deceased  Same as before
Minimum  Pension Guarantee  Equivalent to one Mexico City minimum  Equivalent to one Mexico City minimum wage on 7/1//97
(MPG)  wage level indexed to actual minimum wage  indexed to the CPI f
a.  Under IVCM contributions could not exceed 10 times the minimum wage and under the new system it is 25 times.
b.  Plus the accumulated  balances in the retirement sub-account (from 1993 to 8/1997) if the worker so wishes.
c.  Government contribution of 5.5% of one minimum wage (MW) - in July 1997 - per day is indexed to the consumer price level.  On average,
this quota will be equivalent to 2.0 % of wages (considering that the average wage is approximately 2.6 times the minimum wage).
d.  Lump withdrawal at retirement permitted only for balances in excess of 130 % of the cost of an annuity equal to the MPG.
e.  Gradual withdrawals will consider insurance to cover probability that they live longer than expected and outlast savings.
f.  Currently average wage for IMSS affiliates is 2.6 minimum wages, thus MPG is approximately 38 % of average wage.Mexico:  The 1997  Pension  Reform  14
Under the reform, contributions to old age and severance in the AFORES'  individual accounts
will equal 6.5 % of a worker's wage (the current 4.5% for old age and severance plus the current 2 %
contribution in the retirement sub-account in the Central Bank) and a Government contribution of 5.5%
of one minimum wage  per day,  known as the  Social Quota that  will be  indexed to  the CPI.  On
average,  this  quota  will  be  equivalent  to  2.2%  of  wages  (considering  that  the  average  wage  is
approximately 2.8 times the minimum wage).  It will be transferred to each worker's  account to which
active contributions are being made.  Transition workers have the right to transfer their  past  SAR
balances to their AFORE. Contributions to the INFONAVIT sub-account, equal to 5 % of a worker's
salary,  will  continue  to  be  invested  in  INFONAVIT  housing  programs.  Total  contributions  for
retirement, therefore, amount to between 12.5 and 17 % of a worker's  wage - for the average worker
they represent 13.5% of the wage.
Benefits under the new system fall into two groups: benefits to new workers and benefits to
transition workers.  New workers are defined as those beginning their contributions to the system after
July 1, 1997.  The first cohort of retirees fully under the new system is expected in approximately 20-
25  years.  Benefits  consist  of  the  accumulated  balances  in  their  individual  retirement  accounts
(AFORES plus INFONAVIT accounts) or the MPG under the new system.  The MPG in the new
system is equal to the minimum wage in Mexico City as of July 1997, indexed to the Consumer Price
Index (CPI).  At retirement, workers will choose between a gradual withdrawal option and buying an
annuity from an insurance company.
Transition workers are defined as those workers currently contributing to the PAYG system.
Although these workers will begin contributing to their new individual retirement accounts after July 1,
1997, they will retain the right to the benefits of the old system exclusively in the case of retirement.
For disability and death cases  the new Law  will apply regardless to  which population  the worker
belongs.  A lifetime  switch option allows transition  generation workers to  choose at retirement the
higher of the acquired benefits under the current PAYG system and the accumulated balances in their
individual  retirement  accounts  under  the  new  system  (AFORES  plus  INFONAVIT  accounts).
Accumulated balances in the INFONAVIT 92-8/97  sub-account and  SAR 92-8/97 balances  will be
surrendered to transition workers upon retirement regardless of which pension scheme they opt for.
The Minimum Pension Guarantee (MPG), to both transition and new workers, is provided by
the Government in the event that the value of the worker's  capitalized savings in his/her individual
retirement account is not sufficient to finance the minimum pension.  The Government contribution
will  only  be  equal  to  the  difference between  the  MPG  and  funds  accumulated  in  the  individual
retirement accounts.
The Rules of Pension Fund Administration
The December 1995 Social Security Law provided that the regulatory and supervisory regime
governing the revised pension system would be the subject of subsequent detailed legislation.  The
Pension Systems Law approved on April 26, 1996 sets out the structure and powers of CONSAR and
provides  guiding  principles  for  the  establishment,  operation  and  supervision  of  pension  fund
administrators (AFORES) and specialized mutual funds for pensions (SIEFORES). The key areas for
regulation and supervision of AFORES and SIEFORES are as follows:
*  Supervision of the  reformed system: A strengthened CONSAR.  The Pension  Systems Law
grants CONSAR broad powers to set and enforce rules and standards for all aspects of operation ofMexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  15
the  revised  pension  system.  CONSAR  has  full  supervisory  authority  over  AFORES  and
SIEFORES, as well as supervisory authority over other participants in the pension system (such as
banks and insurance companies) to the extent the activities of such entities involve the pension
system.  CONSAR is empowered to issue regulations,  conduct examinations, impose fines  and
sanctions and recommend criminal prosecutions.  In the event that irregularities are uncovered in
the operations of any entity subject to CONSAR supervision (including AFORES and SIEFORES),
CONSAR is authorized to  effect an  administrative or management  intervention of  such entity.
CONSAR  may  revoke  the  authorization  of  any  AFORE  or  SIEFORE  found  to  be  out  of
compliance with the Pension Systems Law or CONSAR regulations.
ATLANTICO  Banca Promex (25%, ME), Banco del Atlantico (25%, ME), GBM, Valores Finamex
BANAMEX  Grupo Financiero Banamex-Accival
BANCOMER  Grupo Financiero Bancomer (5 1%, ME), Aetna International-AFP (3  3%, US), Santa Maria International (16%, CH)
BANCRECER  Bancrecer (51%, ME), Dresdner Pension Fund Holdings, Allianz Mexico (49%)
BANORTE  Banorte (51%0/,  ME), Belgica Insurance Holdings, Maatschappij Graafschap Holland N.V.
BITAL  ING America Insurance Holding
CAPITALIZA  GE Capital de Mexico, GE Capital Assurance Co.
CONFIA-PRINCIPAL  Banca Confia (5 1%, ME), Principal International (49%, US)
GARANTE  Banca Serfin (51%, ME), Citibank Mexico (40%/o,  ME), AFP Habitat (9%/o,  CH)
GENESIS  Seguros Genesis, Metropolitan Life Insurance
INBURSA  Banco Inbursa (100%, ME), Cia. de Servicios Inbursa
PREVINTER  Inverlat (51%, ME), Bank of Nova Scotia, American International Group, Bank of Boston
PROFUTURO GNP  Grupo Nacional Provincial (51%, ME), Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (25%, SP), Provida Internacional (24%, CH)
SANTANDER  Banco Santander Mexicano (100%, ME), Santander Investments (SP)
TEPEYAC  Seguros Tepeyac, MAPFRE International
XXI  IMSS, Aseguradora Hidalgo, IXE Grupo Financiero
ZURICH  Zurich Vida Compania de Seguros, Gabriel Monterrubio, Private Investors
Source:  CONSAR
[a] partner listed first is either a Mexican company or the Mexican subsidiary of an international parent corporation
This partner is entitled to a 51% stake in the venture
[b] figures in millions of pesos
ME: Mexico; US: Inited States; CH: Chile; SP: Spain
*  Nature  and  Control  of  AFORES.  AFORES  are single-purpose  business  corporations  with
independent capitalization.  Each AFORE will maintain a minimum paid-in capital of N$25 million
and a special reserve equal to the greater of N$25 million or 1% of the total assets of SIEFORES
under management.  The paid in capital and special reserve are required to be invested in shares of
the  SIEFORES managed  by  the AFORE.  The capital  of an  AFORE  that  is  a  subsidiary  of a
financial group will not be available to meet the obligations of other subsidiaries of the same group.
As an additional safeguard, financial intermediaries (including banks) or financial groups that are
not in full compliance with applicable capital standards may not be shareholders of an AFORE.
The establishment of AFORES requires the authorization of CONSAR, which may grant or deny
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and management of the firm. CONSAR is empowered to revoke the authorization of an AFORE or
SIEFORE that fails to meet the standards set forth in law and regulations.  Seventeen AFORES
have been authorized by CONSAR (Table 6).
Foreign Ownership. Regulations allow for a  class of AFORES majority-controlled  by  foreign
financial  institutions  (but  not  individuals  or  industrial  concerns).  Financial  institutions  from
NAFTA countries, 2 Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela may establish majority-owned AFORES.
Up to 49% of the shares of such foreign-owned AFORES may be held by other foreign or Mexican
shareholders.  Foreign-owned AFORES receive equal treatment with  Mexican-owned AFORES
and are not be subject to the types of market share limitations that Mexico enforces against foreign-
owned banks and brokers/dealers.
*  Conflicts of Interest.  The  Pension  Systems Law  establishes  strict  limitations  on permissible
transactions  between  AFORES  and  affiliated  financial  institutions  and  issuers.  CONSAR
recognizes that given that a large percentage of pension contributions may ultimately be managed
by  AFORES, which  are subsidiaries  of  financial groups  and/or  affiliated  with  other financial
institutions, strict supervision and enforcement of conflict of interest rules will be required to build
public confidence in the system.  The regulation governing the investment regime establishes that a
SIEFORE may invest no more than 5% of its total  assets in securities  issued or guaranteed by
entities that have a management or shareholding nexus with the SIEFORE.
*  Market Share Limits.  An initial 17% limit on the system accounts that may be managed by any
single AFORE  is  set.  To  assure  that  no  AFORE  receives  an  unfair  competitive  advantage,
CONSAR refrained from  authorizing the first AFORES until it was able to  grant simultaneous
authorizations to a significant number of competitors.
*  Responsibility of Officers and Directors. The Pension Systems Law provides that members of
the board of directors, the general director and the compliance officer of each AFORE  must be
approved by CONSAR on the basis of the moral integrity and technical and management capacity
of the nominees. CONSAR is authorized to remove any  director, officer, compliance officer or
other officer found to lack the moral integrity or technical and management capacity required for
such position.
*  Publicity  and  Marketing.  SIEFORES  must  distribute  prospectuses  that  fairly  describe  their
portfolio  and  investment policies.  All  such prospectuses  must  be  reviewed  and  approved by
CONSAR.  CONSAR has  issued initial  regulations  covering  the promotion  and  marketing  of
AFORES  and  SIEFORES  and  is  expected  to  issue  more  detailed  guidelines  on  the  required
contents and presentation of prospectuses as practice in this area develops.
*  Commissions and fee structure.  CONSAR has issued regulations which authorize each AFORE
to freely set management fees based on a percentage of contributions (a front-end fee), a percentage
of assets under management, or some combination of the two (Table 7).
2  U.S. and  Canadian subsidiaries  branches of  financial  institutions  from  non-NAFTA  countries  are treated  as  U.S.  or  Canadian
institutions.  Accordingly, European and Japanese financial institutions can gain access to the Mexican market through their U.S. and
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&t^  1.40  0.00  20.00  E
>~~00  4.75  ***  0.00  B  0 
t  1.70  ***  1.50  **  0.00  D
1.60  0.00  0.00  A 0.00  4~.00  0.00  A
0.90.0  1.00  0.00  D
9 3;  1.68  0.00  0.00  A
1.60  0.00  0.00  A
nb~k~  0.00  0.00  0.00  C 1.68  ~0.00  0.00  A
0.0  ~  ~  0.0  0.00  D30  Pv3 1.55  0.00  0.00  A
>  ~~~~1.70  0.50  0.00  D  l
~~~~~1.70  1.00  0.00  Dl
1.17  ~1.00  0.00  D
>  1.50  0.99  0.00  D
0.95  1.25  **0.00  D
Source: CONSAR Tabulations,  8 July 1997
Notes:
* Initial rate is 0.2% of pay rising to 1.7% by March of 1998.
** Charge on assets to fall over time if participant remains in that AFORE.
***  Charge to fall over time if participant remains in that AFORE.
Memorandum:  Type of Commission
A: On pay alone (7 of 17)  Av % A:  1.67
B: On assets alone (I of 17)  Av % B:  4.75
C: On real returns alone (I  of 17)  Av % C:  33
D: Mixture of A&B (7 of 17)  Av. D (pay%;asset %):  1.27  1.03
E: Mixture of A&C (I  of 17)  Av. E (pay %,ROR %)  1.40  20.00
*  Investor protection. Each AFORE must establish a specialized unit to respond to questions and
claims from workers and employers.  More importantly for investor security, the law provides for
submission of claims of workers and employers that are not settled by such a unit, to a system of
conciliation and arbitration overseen by CONSAR.
I  Initially Single Class of SIEFORES.  The Pension Systems Law authorizes CONSAR to permit
each AFORE to manage and offer to its customers a variety of SIEFORES with different portfolio
compositions,  provided  that  each  AFORE  offers  at  least  one  SIEFORE  whose  portfolio  is
composed "fundamentally" of securities whose returns are indexed to the Mexican CPI.  Mexican
legislators felt that to assure public confidence in the system, participants need to be provided with
the option of investing in instruments offering a real rate of return.  There are no minimum return
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At  the  outset  CONSAR  has  allowed  each  AFORE  to  establish  only  a  single  SIEFORE,
"fundamentally"  invested in indexed instruments.  CONSAR intends eventually  to permit  each
AFORE to offer customers a variety of equity and debt funds with distinct  investment policies.
This  decision  to  restrict  each  AFORE  to  only  a  single  debt  fund  at  the  outset  reflects  the
government's  desire to simplify supervision in the first year of pension  fund operations, reduce
potential confusion among the public and build public support by avoiding volatility.  Article 4 of
the draft investment regime regulations interprets the term "fundamentally" to require that at least
51% of the assets of the initial SIEFORES be represented by debt instruments indexed to consumer
inflation.
Table 8: Portfolio  Limits
-91  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(as  %of fund)
Government debt  100
Equity securities  0s  i
Eligible bank debt (issued or guaranteed by a commercial bank) (1) (2)  10
fiTotal  eligible private debt (corporate and commercial bank) and development bank  35
obligationsl
Investment in instruments issued or guaranteed by any single issuer as a percentage  10
of SIEFORE assets
Investment in instruments issued or guaranteed by any single issuer, as a percentage  10  b
of the issuer's securitiesl
Investment  a  single  any  issue as a percentage of such issue  10  b
Investment in instruments issued or guaranteed by issuers belonging to the same  1  5|
financia , commercial or industrial groupn as a percentage of SIEFORE assets  i
Investment in instruments issued or guaranteed by affiliates of the SIEFORE as a  5  r
percentage of SIEFORE assets  T
(l)  Short-tern  obligations  (less than one year maturit)  must be  rated in the top three rating categories  by an authorized  rating agency;
long-term  obligations  must be rated in the top two categories. CONSAR's  Risk Analysis  Committee  will establish  criteria for when  a
rating  from a single  agency  is inadequate  and when  commercial  banks would  be required  to secure  a rating  from an additional  agency.
(2) The  securities  of banks  that have undergone  intervention  by the authorities  are ineligible  for investment  by SIEFORES;
Portfolio  Composition.  CONSAR  is empowered  to establish  prudential  regulations  governing  the
portfolio composition of SIEFORES.3 Table 8 summarizes the prudential limitations included in
the  investment  regime  regulation  for  the  initial  SIEFORES  issued  on  June  29,  1997.  The
limitations to be imposed reflect CONSAR's  consideration of a number of characteristics of the
Mexican securities markets, including: (i) the degree of liquidity of many listed equity securities;
(ii) the suitability of poorly-rated debt instruments for mandatory  pension  funds; (iii) the  small
3CONSAR  regulations  are subject to the general requirement  (Art. 43) that  100% of the  portfolio be  invested  in cash
and/or securities and the prohibition against foreign investment included in Transitory Art. 38 of the Social Security Law.Mexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  19
number of private issuers and the dangers of concentration of investment in related companies; and
(iv) concerns about the appropriateness of excessive investment in the banking system.
Disability and Life:  IMSS and Insurance Companies Living Together
The reform separates disability and life insurance coverage from the other lines of insurance,
which IMSS continues to manage.  As a result, funds can no longer be combined.  Total contributions
for disability and life insurance are 2.5% of wages (an additional 1.5-% will be drawn for reserves for
pensioners' health expenses).  Eligibility requirements for disability were increased from 150 weeks to
250 weeks.  Disability and death pensions in the new system became 35% of the average wage for the
last 500 weeks, computed in real terms.  IMSS retains responsibility over the management of this line
of  insurance,  but  private  insurance  companies  provide  benefits  through  annuities.  Preliminary
estimates  by the  Ministry  of Finance  suggest that  in  1997 private  insurance  companies  will earn
US$1.1 billion in premiums and will pay pensions in the amount of US$33 million during the same
year.  The relative importance of these earnings is better appreciated if we consider that direct premia
in the Mexican insurance market in 1994 totaled US$6 billion.
Looking South
The reforms being carried out in Mexico, while broadly similar to those adopted in other Latin
American countries, differ in several significant ways.  Table 9 summarizes key comparisons between
Mexico and four other countries in the region that have recently carried out pension reform.
Eligibility requirements.  The number of years of contribution to be eligible for the benefits of
the new system are higher in Mexico (at 25 years) than in other recent reforms.  In addition, Mexico
has defined a week as equal to seven working days, which, in practice, extends the eligibility period.
This high eligibility requirement reduces liabilities under the Government's MPG.
Phasing out of contributions to PAYG system. Unlike the new pension systems in Chile,
Argentina,  Colombia, and  Peru the  option to  continue  to  contribute to  a PAYG  scheme has been
completely eliminated under the new Mexican system, even for transition workers.  Transition workers
will have a choice  on the benefit side upon their retirement,  but not on the contribution side. This
approach is also different from the Colombian  reform, which  allows continuous switching by new
entrants between the two systems (every three years).  Like in Chile, all vestiges of the old PAYG
system will disappear with the last cohort of transition workers around 2025.
Minimum  Pension  Guarantee.  The  MPG  is  lower  in  Mexico  than  in  other  countries,
equivalent at present to approximately  38% of the average  wage after 25 years of contributions,  a
figure which is expected to decline to 25% of the average wage by the time the first cohort of new
workers retires (about 2025) as real wages increase.  The decrease results from the assumption that the
minimum wage will grow at a lower rate than the average wage.  Upon retirement, the Government
covers the differential between the MPG and accumulated balances in the retired individual's account.
The Lifetime switch option.  Mexico's pension reform also differs in that the Government will
not issue recognition bonds (as in Chile) or compensatory pensions (as in Argentina) to explicitly value
current workers'  past pension  contributions.  Under the Mexican scheme, workers can compare the
benefits of the two systems at retirement and choose the higher of the two.  The Mexican Government
could not issue recognition bonds or compensatory pensions because of the legal treatment of acquiredMexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  20
rights, which made it difficult to explicitly attach a value to a worker's acquired benefits under the old
PAYG system up until the time of the reform 4.
Commissions.  The Mexican Law is the only one to date that allows freedom of commissions
and fee structure, with discounts allowed.
V. ESTIMATION  OF THE FISCAL  COSTS OF THE REFORM
What is the Bill? A Summary of Results
The full benefits of a pension reform are not felt unless the fiscal costs of the existing unfunded
system are made explicit to  the extent possible  and  are funded through  a  credible financing plan.
Governments must also define what combination of additional fiscal savings (higher revenues or lower
spending) and borrowing will finance the transition  costs.  As part of the design of the reform, the
Ministry of Finance (SHCP - Secretaria de Hacienda y  Credito Publico) developed a model to estimate
the fiscal costs of the transition, including sensitivity analyses under various assumptions.  A discussion
of the estimated fiscal costs of transition of the Mexican reform is summarized below.
The reform of the Mexican old age security system generates three fiscal consequences: 5
*  the cost ofproviding pensions to existing pensioners before September 1, 1997 (without the income
provided by the PAYG defined benefit system, since all contributions will go to AFORES starting
September 1, 1997)
*  the costs of providing pension  guarantees, including the guarantee of pension benefits under the
old PAYG system to transition workers resulting from the lifetime switch option at retirement, and
the MPG to new workers; and
*  the costs of the Social  Quota contribution to individual accounts indexed to the CPI (the Social
Quota) and Government contributions of 0.425 % of salary towards workers' pension.
Pensions for Existing Retirees.  Fiscal costs for providing for existing pensioners and those receiving
invalidity payments can be estimated accurately since IMSS knows the number of pensioners receiving
benefits and the amount of benefits paid.  These costs equal about 0.4% of GDP for  1997 and will
decline rapidly over time.
4A  discussion of the implications of this approach is presented in section V.
5  In addition,  pension  contributions  can no longer  support  health insurance.Mexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  21
TABLE 9.  PENSION  REFORMS  IN LATIN  AMERICA
(all workers)  contribution  contribution  workers  only)
Transition  arrangements
What happens to old  Phased  out  Continues  with  Continues  with  Continues  with  Eliminateda
system?  changes  changes  changes  to_hoce  beeft  _hage_t
Is current  labor force
allowed  to remain  in old  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Noa
scheme?
Is new  system mandatory
for new labor force  Yes  No  No  No  Yes
entrants?
Can workers  switch  back
to public system?  No  No  No  Yes, every  three  Noa
l_______________  (after June 1996)  years.
Recognition  bonds  Yes  Yesd  Yesb  Yesc  Noe
Profile of new pension  Minimum  pension  MPGI  Flat and minimum  MPG  MPG
scheme What role for  guarantee  (MPG)  Social  assistance  pension  Social assistance  Social Quota
public pillar?  Social assistance  ___________Social  assistance
Total contribution  rate
for new  system:
for old age annuity  1  0  Priv: 8 (10 on 1/97)  8  10  6.5 + 5.0+(S.h
Public: I  I (max 13)
disabio./survivors/adm.  3  .3  3  3.5  4.0
public pillar and soc.  General revenues  I  169  I  General  Revenues
aseistance
Total contribution  rate:
before  reform  19  9  27  8 (private  sec.)  15.5
after  the reform  13  13.3  27  13.5-14.5i  16.5  -21.0
Estimated  implicit  PAYG  126%  (in 1980)  37%  61.6%  141.5%  (in 1994)
debt at time of reformi  (through  2030)  (termination  n.a.  (through  2025)  (through 2069)
(as % of GDP)  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  liability)  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Minimum  rates of return  Benchmark  Benchmar-k  Benchmark
of private  pension  funds  relative  to market  None  relative to market  relative  to  None
average  _________  average  synthetic portfolio
Goverment guarantees  Difference  (Differencc  Difference  Difference  between
on rates  of return of  between  balances  between  balances  None  between  balances  balances  at
private  pension  funds  at retirement  and  at retirement  and  at retirement  and  retirement  and MPG
MPG  MPG)f  ______  MPG
Maximum  percentage  of
portfolio  allowed in:
Domestic  equities  30  35  50  30  0
Foreign  securities  10  5  t0  15  0
Gover.  securities  45  40  50  50  100 (in 1997)
(in _1994)  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
a. Contributions  to the  old  system  cease  on August  31: 1997.  Transition  workers  can  choose  at retirement  the  higher  of the benefits  available  under
the  old PAYG  scheme  or the  new  defined  contribution  plan.
b. "Compensatory  pension"  is  paid upon  retirement,  not as  a bond.  The  value  is based  on  years  of contribution  and  last  ten  years'  eanings.
c. Workers  with  fewer  than  150  weeks  of contributions  are  not  eligible  for a recognition  bond.
d. Only  workers  who  have  contributed  for at least  48  months  in  the  last 10  years  and  have  at least  6 months  prior  to entering  the  new  system.
e. Disclosute  of expected  current  and  future  fiscal  costs  would  be made  on an annual  basis.
f. MPG  introduced  with  second  round  of reforms  in 1995,  but regulations  have  not yet  been  issued.
g. This  is paid  by the  employer.
h. Social  Quota  indexed  to the  CPI  and  estimated  between  I and  5.5  percent  depending  on worker's  income  and  on  average  equivalent  to  2.2 % of
wages.
i. The  rate shown  is for both private and public sector and for 1996  and following  years. Contribution  rate  increased  gradually  during  1994-96.
Different  methodologies used. Source for Colombia  and Chile is Schmidt-Hebbel,  1995  (page  58)  for Peru  is Kane  and Palacios,  1996 (page  38).Mexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  22
Benefits to transition  workers: old age and disability.  Transition workers will choose benefits
under the PAYG system if the accumulated  balances in their individual  retirement  accounts  (in post-
1997 AFORES retirement accounts and  post-1997 INFONAVIT accounts) and  the  investment
performance  of these accounts  are lower than the accrued  benefits under the old PAYG system. The
fiscal cost is the difference  between the value of the accrued benefits under the old PAYG and the
value of the accumulated  balances in the worker's post 1997 individual  account at retirement. This
cost is uncertain. It depends  on the contribution  rate, the number  of years transition  workers  contribute
to the new system,  the growth in real wages, and the rate of return achieved on fund investments.
Under conservative assumptions (2 percent real wage growth, 3.5 percent real rate of return on
AFORES and INFONAVIT  accounts),  the fiscal cost accounted for by these transition workers is
expected  to rise from 0.21  percent of GDP in 1997  to about 0.80 percent  of GDP in 2025.
MPG to New Workers. This MPG is linked  to the minimum  wage of July 1, 1997  indexed  to
the CPI.  As wage growth  takes place the guarantee  will gradually be reduced as a proportion  of the
average wage.  Estimates of these costs are dependent on real wage growth and real investment
performance  as well as the number  of workers  entering  the new system  and the rate of inflation. It also
depends  on the distribution  of workers  within wage categories. The more workers  earning  close to the
minimum wage, the more costly will be the guarantee.  Currently, about 50% of the workers earn
wages equal to or less than 2 times the minimum wage.  The cost of the MPG to new workers is almost
negligible in the earlier years, and increases to about 0.2% of GDP in 2025.
The real value  of governmental guarantees  to  the transition  generation will  continue to  be
affected by inflation; since they will remain linked to minimum wage growth, their value would be
lower with high inflation.  Expected stabilization efforts will therefore increase the fiscal cost of the
transition and induce a higher proportion of workers to opt for the old PAYG benefits rather than the
benefits under the new system.
Social Quota and State Contributions.  The uncertainty of  this cost arises from the unknown number
of workers opting for coverage under the reform.  If pension funds are perceived as lucrative savings
vehicles, many workers now in the informal sector may join the formal sector.  The Social Quota,
being indexed to the CPI, will decline as a percentage of wages through time  as real-wage growth
occurs.  The cost of the Social Quota and State contributions is estimated at 0.33% of GDP in 1997 and
is forecast to equal 0.20 percent of GDP in 2025 assuming a slight increase in coverage.
Estimated Total Fiscal Costs.  The sum of the costs related to pension reform is estimated to
be about 1% of GDP during the next 20 years (Table 10).  The Mexican Government considers these
results quite conservative, given the assumption of  an average  real rate of  return of  3.5% for the
AFORES.Mexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  23
Table 10.  Total Estimated  Fiscal Cost of Pension  Reform in 1997-2025
(percent  of GDP)
A.  Pensions paid to pre 1997 Retirees  0.39  .09  0.03
BI.  MPG to Transition Workers Without  0.21  0.70  0.80
INFONAVIT)
(MPG to Transition Workers  with
INFONAVIT)  0.05  0.38  0.53
B2.  MPG  to New Workers  0  0  0.16
C.  Social Quota and other Govemment
Contributions  0.33  0.25  0.20
TOTAL (without INFONAVIT)  0.93  1.04  1.19
TOTAL  (with INFONAVIT)  0.77  0.72  0.92
Source: SHCP.
On the methodology, two points should be noted: (i) the income distribution used in the model
might underestimate the proportion of the population at the low-end of the distribution, and in turn, might
underestimate fiscal costs.  However, further analysis of this point provided by the SHCP, indicates that
such underestimation would be no  more than  10% of the fiscal cost; and  (ii) fiscal costs might be
sensitive to the evolution of minimum wages relative to the average wage.  Under the projected scenarios
the minimum wage decreases as a function of the average wage.  Should they grow parallel under the
projected scenarios the fiscal cost would be higher.  However, preliminary calculations of this relation
provided by the SHCP show that this cost would be at the most 5% of the total fiscal costs.  Also, SHCP
demonstrated that  historically speaking the Mexican case illustrates that  there is  a  poor  correlation
between the movement of the minimum wage and the average wage, and that minimum wages have
shown a declining trend during the last 25 years.
Table 11 shows present value (PV) estimates of the flow projection of 1% of GDP during the
next twenty years.  The PV was calculated taking the flow of fiscal costs for the same period of time as
the one used to calculate the PV of future pension deficits of 141.5% of GDP (Table 2) and discounting
it with an average real discount rate of return of 3.5% (calculated as the difference between the nominal
rate of return and the rate of inflation).  Other financial assumptions were also consistent in both cases.Mexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  24
1997  0.42  2011  0.61
1998  0.83  2012  0.60
1999  0.82  2013  0.59
2000  0.79  2014  0.58
2001  0.77  2015  0.58
2002  0.77  2016  0.57
2003  0.75  2017  0.56
2004  0.73  2018  0.55
2005  0.70  2019  0.54
2006  0.68  2020  0.54
2007  0.67  2021  0.53
2008  0.65  2022  0.53
2009  0.64  2023  0.52
2010  0.62  2024  0.52
Source: SHCP.
The difference between this result and the 141.5% of GDP (in 1994) occurs because of the way
the new law states that the Government will have to face the new systems' obligations as opposed to
those of the old system.  For instance, the new system includes new  obligations such as the Social
Quota, the  new MPG  indexed to  prices  as  opposed to  the  old  pension  guarantee  indexed to  the
minimum wage, and a redistribution of the former contributions to the system between the government,
the worker and the  employer.  Another important  difference has  to  do  with  the fact that  pension
contributions will go to individual accounts, which will be capitalized at a market rate of return.  As a
result, fiscal costs are lower since workers who opt for benefits under the old PAYG system will have
to surrender the accumulated balances in their individual accounts to the Government.
Fiscal Costs:  Assumptions and Scenario Analysis
Estimating the size of contributing population.  The first step in the estimation of the fiscal
costs was to project the size of the future population, which would enroll in the IMSS scheme.  IMSS
does not publish this information and demographic projections prepared recently by the Luis Donaldo
Colosio Foundation were used.  These projections show that, in the long run, the population affiliated to
the IMSS as a proportion of  economically active population (EAP) would grow from 28% to 38% by
2031.
The second step was to determine the contributors age distribution.  For the transition population
this was obtained using the IMSS tables of number of affiliates (1982-1993) broken down by age.  The
proportion by chronological age was established by applying moving averages to the 1982-1993 data,
which show very small year-to-year variation.  For new entrants, IMSS' Age Frequency Table for new
affiliates was used which shows that entrants are predominantly under 30 years old.  The age distribution
of the contributing population will change as function of new entrants' age.  Entrants' age distribution is
assumed to be the same throughout the projection period.Mexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  25
Assumptions:  Insured/EAP  Ratio
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E:stimating  workers'  salaries.  The  wage  of  a person  of  a given  age  was  determined  by  using  the
data  for  average  salary  history,  i.e.  the  average  age/salary  couplets  recorded  by  the  IMSS  for  a given  year.
These  amnounts  are  expressed  as  a  multiple  of  the  minimum  wage.  The  available  data  comprised  the
salary  histories  reported  for  15  years  (1977-86  and  1990-94).  To  these  observations  a  curve  was  fitted
using  a  polynomial  to  describe  the  average  salary  history  of  IMSS  members.  Average  salary  history
expressed  as  a  multiple  of  the  minimum  wage  is  constant  throughout  the  projection  period  but  it  is
assumed  that  the  minimum  wage  rises  in real  terms.
Assumptions:  Increase  in Real  Salaries
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Financial  hypotheses.  The real interest rate was assumed  to be 3.5%  throughout  the projection
period.  Assumptions  on  returns  are  quite  conservative  given  that  the  average  real  interest  rate  between
1983-1995  in Mexico  was  almost  9%.  For  sensitivity  purposes,  an  even  lower  real  interest  rate  (2%)  was
used  for  a  number  of  scenarios.  Lower  returns  mean  lower  savings  in  an  individual's  account  and  a
higher  probability  of  choosing  benefits  under  the  old  PAYG  scheme  or requiring  the  MPG  from  the  State.
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GDP growth assumnptions suggest  a modest  recovery  for the next  six years (less than  projections
made  by  the  SHCP)  to  start  with  a  conservative  scenario.  Growth  after  2000  stabilizes  below  the  rates
observed  during  the  1  970s.'Mexico:  The 1997 Pension Reform  27
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Note: These  assumptions  are for modeling  purposes  only  and can not be taken  as official  forecasts.
Recent  observed data  show  an  enormous variance the real  growth  of  wages.  In  addition,
minimum wages and wages resulting from bargaining between workers and firms  (basic salary for
contributions) have evolved differently in real terms since 1988.  The best example of this is wages in
manufacturing. As a result, different assumptions were made on real growth for the minimum wage and
for contractual salaries. For contractual salaries, real growth rates are shown in the graph below.
For the minimum wage there are two series of assumptions on its evolution based on two inflation
scenarios (Table 13).
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Inflation is especially important for the old PAYG system, since those pensions were computed
taking the average of a worker's nominal wages in the previous 5 years.  In a high inflation environment
we can expect the fiscal costs arising from the recognition of acquired rights to fall (Table 14).
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O)fficial  forecasts  on the subject.
IMSS data shows contribution density for its affiliates is on average 0.83  (i.e., for each period of
time the effective contribution period is only 83%). Years of service and contributions are affected in the
model by this density factor.
Finally, regarding operational costs, the AFORES will be private firms whose only source of
income will be  commissions charged to their affiliates.  Experience in  Chile and Peru indicates that
commissions (excluding  disability  insurance premiums)  can  reach  up  to  2%  of  workers'  wages.
Therefore, we have assumed that commissions charged by the AFORES to the workers will be equivalent
to 2% of covered wages.  This arnount will not accumulate in the individual account.
Government contributions to the pension scheme. The contributions that the Government is
required by law to make to the new pensions scheme are as follows:
||Social  quota  per worker: 5.5%  of I minimum  salary as of December  31, 1996,
||indexed to the CPI.
Proportional  quota:  0.425%  of the worker's salary.
11Proportional  quota: 0. 125%/ of the worker's  salary.l
The social quota is the largest cost item among government contributions to the new pensions
system. Its cost will be close to 0.3% of GDP in 1997 and will remain steady at that level during the first'Mexico:  The 1997 Pension Reform  29
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nine years of the reform.  Later,  it will decline as a result of (JUl 2 l  growth, which will predominate over
that of growth in number of workers.  The following graph depicts how total cost practically coincides
with the cost of the social quota since the level of prorated contributions cost arc minimal  .
Transition workers.  The transition group comprises three categories of workers:
1  . All workers that at the effective date of the reform (September 1, 1997) were active andl therefore
acquired rights during the effectiveness of the previous law.
1.  Workers that contributed to the IMSS at some time but were not active at the effective date of the
reform and may later begin to contribute again.
2.  Workers that were receiving an IMSS pension prior to September 1, 1997.
As discussed earlier, upon retirement workers in categories 1 and 2 may choose between the
boenefits  under the old PAYG system and the pension benefits accumulated under the individual accounts.
In the model, workers compare the net present value of each flow of payments (PAYG pension vs.
benefits deriving from accumulated balances) and choose the highest 6.
Current pensioners. Pensions in course of payment will be deemed to mean those being paid by
the IMSS up to December 31, 1996.  Beginning when the IMSS's reserves are exhausted, which will
happen during the second year, the government will assume responsibility for financing them.  The
margin of reliability of these estimates is all the greater in that:
*This  is a closed group, i.e. its population does not grow over time;
*The  number of pensioners and the amount of their pensions at the end of 1995 is known and it is
necessary to estimate only the number of persons that will take this pension up to September 1, 1997.
By 1995 its cost was close to 0.4% of  GDP,
*  These workers are not affected by the interest rate since they lack individual accounts and  their
pensions are funded entirely out of fiscal resources.
6 Modeling workers with pre-reform acquired rights who currently are not contributing but that can return to the system is an
area that lacks a proper actuarial model in Mexico. The IMSS has no model or estimated probabilities in this areaMexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  30
The estimates are, however, affected by the real growth in the minimum wage since by law their
pensions have to be indexed to this variable. Since this is a closed group with an average age higher than
that of categories 1 and 2, their population will disappear after 2-3 decades.
Role of the housing sub-account (INFONAVIT).  Contributions to the housing sub-account,
(5% of the worker's salary with a ceiling of 10 times the minimum wage) are managed by INFONAVIT.
INFONAVIT operates a points system to determine which contributors are entitled to apply for a housing
loan.  For loan beneficiaries, the savings on this sub-account are used as a down payment to acquire a
dwelling and they will be required to repay the rest of the loan through deductions from their salaries and
future employer contributions.  This means that there may well be workers who at the time they retire
have a zero balance on this sub-account. Workers who do not receive a loan are entitled to withdraw the
balance of the housing sub-account at the time they take their pension.
The decision to finance rights acquired under the old pensions scheme through the housing sub-
account is not available since a worker currently receives his or her IVCM pension plus the contributions
to INFONAVIT.  Nevertheless, the new CONSAR Law establishes that contributions to INFONAVIT
prior to September 1997 must be refunded to the worker, but contributions from September 1997 onwards
are considered part of the individual account and must be surrendered to the State if benefits under the old
pension system are chosen.
In  view  of  all  these  facts transition  costs  for  the  transition  population  must  be  computed
considering different scenarios (under low and high inflation scenarios):
*  Scenario 1.- INFONAVIT funds can be used to finance acquired rights.  From 1997 to 2004 these
funds receive a 0% real return and a 3.5% real return from 2005. AFORES' real return is 3.5%.
*  Scenario 2.- INFONAVIT funds can be used to finance acquired rights.  Nevertheless, these funds
receive a 0% real return throughout the projection period.  AFORES' real return is 3.5%.
*  Scenario 3.- INFONAVIT funds can not be used to finance acquired rights.  AFORES' real return is
3.5%.  Since new generations do not have acquired rights on INFONAVIT funds, this scenario does
not apply to them.  For presentation purposes for them we will include the results from scenario 1 (the
MPG) on tables belonging to scenario 3 for transition population.
*  Scenario 4.- INFONAVIT funds can be used to finance acquired rights.  Nevertheless, these funds
receive a 0% real return between 1997-2004 and 2% after 2004. AFORES' real return is 2.0%.
Fiscal  cost  of  recognizing  acquired  rights.  This  simulation  does  not  assume  a  fixed
contribution period for transition workers. The length of the contribution period for a worker depends on
the probabilities of pensioning (having an accident or retiring). In consequence, some workers will leave
the system earlier if they suffer an accident.  Having reached the age of 60, probabilities of retirement
become positive, nevertheless there will be workers still active even if they are 65 or older.  Currently,
IMSS' pensioners show an average contribution period of 22 years, so, applying current probabilities our
transition population will have the same average period of contributions (some under the Old and some
under the New Law, depending on the worker's age).
Results of scenario analysis. The fiscal costs of reform of the Social Security Law, for selected
years  and  8  scenarios  (under  the  4  INFONAVIT  scenarios  and  under  low  and  high  inflation
environments), are summarized  in the following two graphs.  Ongoing pensions (PCP) are very sensitive
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these pensions are indexed to it according the old Law.  Under low inflation assumptions (Projections
Series B), ongoing pension costs represent 0.39% of 1997 GDP.  By 2030 ongoing pensions decrease to
0.015% of GDP.
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Assuming high inflation (Projections Series A), hence negative real growth in minimum wages,
ongoing pension costs decreases to 0.35% of 1997 GDP. By 2030 it represents only 0.014% of GDP.
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V.  KEY CHALLENGES  TO THE REFORMED SYSTEM
Mexico's pension reform strategy aims at:
*  increasing the equity, efficiency, and sustainability of the old age security system and  gradually
lead to greater effective coverage;
*  establishing a financially viable pension system;
*  limiting the fiscal impact of the current pension system and ensure transparency of the fiscal costs
of the transition;
*  enhancing  financial market  development and  reducing  volatility  by  stimulating greater  private
financial intermediation and increasing the array of financial instruments and contracts available;
and
*  contributing to enhance the allocative efficiency of domestic and,  in the longer-term, to raising
aggregate savings.
Full realization of the objectives of the reform and the potential positive  impact on  savings
hinge on addressing a number of concerns relating to the correction of design limitations as well as
confronting implementation challenges.
Correcting Design Limitations7
A number of concerns relating to the basic design of the reform have been raised.  While it is
understood that these limitations could not be addressed prior to the beginning of the reform, they are
highlighted here to  stress that corrective measures should be considered at the earliest opportunity.
There appear to be six main limitations in the current design of the reform.
Expansion  of  the  reform  to  public  sector  workers.  No  changes  are  being  currently
contemplated in the ISSSTE, PEMEX, other parastatals, armed forces, and the state pension  plans.
Hence, the portability constraint across private and public sector workers' pension plans will remain for
now an issue along with the financial disequilibrium to be faced in the future by these pension funds.
Also, the partial character of the reform limits  its potential positive  savings impact.  The primary
reason for the partial reform has been limited political consensus. The successful introduction of the
defined contribution scheme for the private sector employees is likely to push all the unfunded state
employee pension plans in the same direction.
The  Lifetime switch option and contingent fiscal costs.  Overall, expected fiscal costs are
lower than in other Latin American reforms.  However, the variance seems much greater.  As a result,
some of the benefits of making fiscal costs explicit could potentially be lost in the Mexican reform.  In
particular, pension reform experts have strongly suggested that the Mexican government should have
issued recognition bonds based on three main criticism of the current design:
*  Moral hazard concerns.  The first critique is that older workers will choose benefits under the old
pension scheme, notwithstanding how much they save.  This creates a moral hazard drawback by
which workers getting close to retirement will tend to prefer high risk investments. This concern
underscores the need for strong and flexible investment management regulations for pension funds.
7This  section incorporates on-going work by Hemant Shah (Shah, 1996) and suggestions by Dimitri Vittas, Estelle James,
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*  Inter-generational equity. A second critique has been that the lifetime switch option may lead to an
unfair treatment of the transition generations compared to the issuance of recognition bonds.  In
countries which opted for recognition bonds or compensatory pensions the transition generation at
retirement gets both the value of the bond and the accumulated balances in the individual account,
while in the Mexican system the worker choosing the new system will only get the accumulated
balances.  Nonetheless, under the new Mexican system it is guaranteed that everyone will do at
least as well as they would have done under the old system, and they have the possibility of doing
even better'.
*  Fiscal risks and  implications on the sustainability of  the reform. Third, on the fiscal  side, the
Mexican plan is more risky than the approach followed in other Latin American countries because
the Government's liability is uncertain.  Public pension debt accrued on account of the liabilities
corresponding to the transition generation is not accurately measured, nor is it completely provided
for. There is no individual calculation of actuarial reserves demanded as it has been done with the
scheme of recognition bonds employed in other pension reforms (Chile and Colombia). Mexican
fiscal costs, as  compared to  Chile's,  for example, could be  (i) higher,  if returns  on  individual
contributions (AFORES + INFONAVIT) are not  high enough to  ensure that a large number of
transition workers choose, at retirement, the new system rather than the accrued benefits under the
old PAYG, but could be (ii) lower, because Mexico is saving the cost of recognition bonds if the
market value at retirement of individual accumulated balances exceeds accrued benefits under the
old PAYG system.
The Government's daily Social Quota partially recognizes the Government's potential liability.
However, funding  this  expected liability  separately and collectively  rather than through  the  social
quota, which  subsidizes even workers  who would  have  in  any  event retired  above the  minimum
pension, could further reduce the potential fiscal burden.
Implications  of the  failure to  restructure the PAYG  system.  The  Government did  not
restructure the current PAYG system as part of the 1997 reform.  Because the reform program allows
for a lifetime switch between the old and new system for every transition worker, what happens to the
benefits under the old system beQomes a  very important parameter of the program.  The failure to
restructure the old system reflects the political realities of Mexico, but the old system continues to be a
nominal system with many structural weaknesses that make the results  of the reform program very
sensitive to the future rate of inflation.
8  To compare the inter-generational equity and the fiscal costs of the lifetime switch to the recognition bond calculation,
assume that for a Mexican worker the MPG at retirement  is 100 as calculated under the old PAYG both pre and post-
reform.  If at retirement the worker has  accumulated 101 in the  individual accounts (AFORES + INFONAVIT) he  will
choose the benefits under the new system and the Government saves the pension benefits which the worker  had accrued
during the pre-reform period.  If the worker has accumulated only 60 in the individual accounts he will choose the benefits
under the old PAYG (100) - but the  Government pays  only 40,  i.e. the  difference between the  individual accumulated
balances  and  the  accrued benefits  under the  PAYG  system both pre  and  post-reform.  In both  scenarios  the  Mexican
transition worker gets at least as much as he would have accrued if he had continued contributing to the old PAYG.  In the
first scenario, a comparable Chilean worker - who at the time of the reform had 40 in accrued benefits - would get 141 (of
which 40 in recognition bonds plus 101 from AFPs) but the Government would still have to pay the 40 in accrued benefits.
In the second scenario, the Chilean worker gets 100 - the same as the Mexican worker - of which 40 in recognition bonds
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The choice of benefits, as well as its fiscal cost, will depend on variables such as inflation, the
real return on transition workers' post-1997 contributions and the real rate of growth of the minimum
wage. Higher inflation will lead to  less people choosing the former pension, since it was computed
from the retiring worker's  average nominal wage.  Higher earnings and rates of return will  lead to
higher individual savings and higher pensions under the new law.  Should real returns be higher than
expected, more transition workers will take their benefits under the new program, thereby reducing
fiscal costs.
For transition workers, the minimum guarantee is grandfathered from the old system, because
of legal constraints related to acquired rights.  For them, the minimum guarantee continues to be: (i)
based on an average of their last 5 years'  nominal wages, or (ii) equal to the minimum wage at their
point  of  retirement,  indexed to  the  minimum  wage thereafter  - whichever  is higher.  If  inflation
becomes very low, the first clause will be operative and the fiscal costs could be large.  If inflation is
high the second clause is operative, as it is now for 80% of retirees.  In this case, all transition workers
would  be  entitled to  38% of  the  average  wage,  indexed  to  (minimum)  wage  growth-still  a  high
guarantee.  It will be even higher if the minimum wage is raised faster than the average wage.  This is
very  likely because the  minimum  is now at  a  historical low  relative  to the  average  and  political
pressure from workers and prospective pensioners could easily push it up to  50 or 60% of average.
This would have immediate fiscal implications and might compromise the long-run  sustainability of
the reform.  Notwithstanding  this  warning,  as a result  of the appropriateness  of the timing  of the
reform, the estimated fiscal costs are so low that even if there are setbacks to the reform program as a
result of design limitation, fiscal costs are expected to remain below 2% of GDP per year.
Limited funding of  AFORES and  the role  of INFONAVIT.  AFORES will  manage,  in
individual accounts, between 7.5 and 12% of workers' salaries, depending on salary level, before fees
and commissions.  Fees and costs are currently approximately 2% of salary, leaving at most 5.5-10% in
the  AFORES  investment  accounts.  This  amount  itself  is  insufficient  for  a  reasonable  retirement
pension  for most workers.  The rest would have to come from the housing fund contribution (5%)
managed by INFONAVIT.  Hence, under the reform, contributions  to  INFONAVIT will represent
between 30 and 40 % of total contributions to pension accounts.  It is critical that INFONAVIT earn a
positive real rate of return, assuring better pension benefits for workers and reducing the fiscal costs of
the reform.
The ramifications of INFONAVIT not earning positive real rates of return include: (i) higher
fiscal  costs  as  a  poor  financial  performance  by  INFONAVIT  lowers total  returns  on  individual
accounts and increases the probability that younger transition workers will choose the old PAYG over
the new system or that the Government will have to provide for a MPG for new workers; and (ii) the
loss of potential  retirement  income by  workers just  entering the new  system  which  could lead to
continued evasion.
Impact of Administrative Costs 9. In Mexico, each AFORE has selected its own approach to
the  setting  of  commissions,  since  the  government  does  not  regulate  the  level  nor  the  form  of
commissions.  Commissions charged  by Mexican pension  managers  are currently  in  line  with,  or
slightly lower than, those computed for defined contribution plans in other Latin American countries.
9 This  section  is based on on-going  work by Olivia  Mitchell  (The Wharton  School)  financed  by the World  Bank.Mexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  35
In the near future there will be pressure to reduce these commissions, in order to boost investment
returns  on pension  contributions.  Better returns  are imperative to reduce fiscal  costs for transition
workers and to improve retirement benefits for new workers to a level above the government minimum
guarantee.
The typical pattern is for the AFORE to charge a one-time up front fee; in fact, 7 of the 17 plans
have imposed a frontload charge averaging  1.67% of covered pay. But as Table 2 shows, another 7
plans impose both a one-time pay-based charge totaling 1.27% of pay and an additional annual 1.03%
of assets.  The remaining three plans  charged either  an  annual percent  of assets alone  (4.75%), a
fraction of annual real returns alone (33%), or a commission levied on both contribution amounts and
returns.  It should be noted that these commissions correspond to first-year rates only.  In most cases,
the pension plans indicate that they will reduce commissions charged to participants who remain in that
AFORE  for a  longer period  of time.  The declining commission  pattern  is  intended  to  discourage
workers from moving their money into a new AFORE, as soon as cross-fund transfers are permitted in
September 1998 for the first time.
The  data  presented  compares
administrative  cost  figures  for  the
Mexican  pension  commissions - C  v  in  i  Latin  Anieric.n
(affiliate-weighted)  expressed  as  a  :  t.  -
single, one-time, front load, with those  Coun,  % of Coy.  Pay ,  ,  ,  ~~~~~~~ ~~~Country  % of Cov. PayI
of four other Latin  nations..  Argentina  2.410
Chile  2.291
Another  challenge  to  the  Peru  2.294
Mexican reform lying in  the months  Uruguay  2.070
ahead is the problem of AFORE agents  Mexico  1.919
aiming at "switching"  affiliates among  Simple  Av.  2.197
AFOREs.  In  Chile,  Argentina,  and
other  countries,  prevailing  fee  Source:  CONSAR  (1997),  p. 19-20.
regulations  induce  "armies"  of  AFP  Note:  Mexican  data  affiliate-weighted  as of I April  1997
agents,  a torrent  of  account  transfers,  All  computations  assume  commission  is a 1-time  frontloaded  fee.
and a considerable increase in operation
costs.
Moral hazard  concerns.  All  privately run pension  systems  with mandatory  contributions
suffer from some general moral hazard.  However, the Mexican reform may induce two additional
sources of moral hazard.  First, the government guarantees a MPG irrespective of the aggressiveness of
the investment strategy chosen by the workers.  This could encourage near-retirement workers whose
investments have significantly under-performed to "bet the bank" at the government's  expense.  This
effect is compounded by the lack of a minimum return requirement.  Second, the implications of the
life time switch option.  Nevertheless, these sources of moral hazard are mitigated by three factors: (i)
the majority of transition workers (65 %) are under 32 years of age; (ii) workers will have their own
individual retirement accounts as opposed to a hypothetical Government guarantee; and (iii) initially
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Confronting Implementation Challenges
On the implementation side, the key challenges ahead to realize the full potential of the 1997
reforms include:
e  ensuring a flexible  regulatory and supervisory framework  with strong enforcement  capacity by
CONSAR  to protect the pension  rights  of participants  in the mandatory  system  while ensuring
adequate rates of return;
*  ensuring  a  smooth  and  efficient  operation  of  new  centralized  system  for  collection,
individualization of accounts, and record-keeping,
*  implementing parallel financial  sector reforms to ensure an adequate supply of quality financial
assets available for pension fund investment; and
•  building public support and confidence in the new pension system so as to avoid evasion and attract
informal workers.
Supervision  and enforcement: strengthening CONSAR
Regulatory  challenges.  Regulation of pension funds will have major consequences for the
success of the reform and for its impact on savings in the long term.  Though justifiable  as initial
conditions or explained by the fragility of the financial sector and political constraints, some features of
the initial regulatory framework may limit the most productive long term investments and/or require
more flexibility as the system evolves.
There  is  an  initial  emphasis on  the  exclusive  and  specialized  investment management  by
AFORES, under strict regulation by CONSAR, which seeks to insulate the reformed pension  system
from existing weaknesses in the financial sector.  This limits the entry of other potential providers (like
mutual fund managers) and restricts the range of available pension and  insurance products  into the
business  of  managing  mandated  retirement  savings.  It  also  creates  an  artificial  separation  from
voluntary  retirement  savings  management,  which  are already  sizable,  and  available  for  the  same
general  purpose.  The  potential  long-term  impacts  of  these  restrictions  are  reduced  risk-return
possibilities and  containment of the expansion of the saving  culture.  There are also  several major
restrictions on investment available to AFORES, which will not be beneficial in the long run neither to
the workers, nor for national savings.  Major examples are the prohibition of investment in foreign
assets and in equities.  The critical variable will be the flexibility of the system in eliminating these
restrictions to respond to changing conditions and the growth of fund assets.
Supervision  and  enforcement.  The  Pension  Systems  Law  pointedly  did  not  adopt  the
governance and supervisory framework applicable to Mexico's  mutual fund industry.  Legislators and
the administration felt that since a handful of financial groups control the bulk of the Mexican banking,
securities and mutual funds industries, the legal regulatory framework for a mandatory  contribution
system should impose stricter rules for independent decision-making and  avoidance of conflicts of
interest.  A  strong  CONSAR with  ample  authority  and  human and  other resources  necessary  to
supervise and enforce compliance was essential.
From the outset, the Government has recognized the need for a strong regulatory authority for
the pension system, with both the legal authority and the human and other resources required to assure
compliance with law and regulations.  The Pension Systems Law grants CONSAR broad powers to set
and  enforce rules  and  standards  for  all  aspects of the  operation  of  the reformed  pension  system.Mexico:  The 1997  Pension  Reform  3  7
CONSAR  has  full  supervisory  authority  over  AFORES  and  SIEFORES,  as  well  as  supervisory
authority over other participants in the pension system (such as banks and insurance companies) to the
extent that the activities of such entities involve the pension system.
CONSAR has prepared an institutional development plan to provide itself with the resources
commensurate with its new responsibilities. The annual budget of the CONSAR is expected to increase
substantially.  Over the next eighteen months, the plan envisages the installation of a new computer
system, a substantial increase in staff, public education programs, the upgrading of key systems and the
training of personnel.  Two-thirds of the new staff will be mid- and high-level personnel.  The annual
budget at CONSAR is expected to increase by approximately 60%.  The priorities  of the plan in the
areas of systems  and personnel include:  development of  actuarial  standards and  methodologies of
analysis; implementation of on-site and off-site supervision programs; drafting of examination manuals
and training of examiners; implementation  of systems and  software to monitor trading activity and
detect irregularities; development of methodologies for measuring risk and assessing the effectiveness
of private securities ratings;  installation of  systems and preparation of staff to  produce a regularly
issued statistical bulletin providing key data on the performance of the pension system.
Operation of new centralized system for collection and individualization of accounts
Mexico has decided to follow a centralized scheme for contributions collection and information
gathering.  Despite its theoretical advantages, the Argentinean experience has shown that this kind of
scheme might lead to operation and incentive problems.  The Mexican version of this process faced a
critical problem in the worker's ID number - which was one of the key factors behind the failure of the
SAR 1992 reform. There are other risks present in the Argentinean scheme that may appear in Mexico,
increasing  operation costs and reducing the workers'  balances. These include  delays in the flow of
money and information due to excessive operations or identification problems in the national database
(PROCESAR).
The  enactment  by  the  Assembly  on  October  28,  1996  of  legislation  postponing  the
implementation of the social security reform from January 1 to July 1 for voluntary contributions (and
September 1 for mandatory contributions) sought to address this concern.  The reform was postponed
for two main reasons: (a) the Government was not ready with the unique identification system, which
is essential to avoid evasion, ghosting etc; and  (b) the Government was not ready with systems for
collection of contributions by IMSS and their transfer to the AFORES. These actions improved the
design of the system and greatly lowered implementation risks.  At that time, the Mexican authorities
decided that it was necessary to install a more powerful system for individualization of accounts and to
move towards  a  centralized and  more reliable  and  accountable  computer-oriented  scheme for  the
payment of contributions.
The  objectives  of  the  integrated  collection  system  are  to  guarantee  the  quality  of  the
information  in  the  individualized  accounts;  integrate  collection  of  all  social  security  payments
(including INFONAVIT contributions) in a unique contribution payment system; facilitate payment by
employers; and facilitate conciliation and control by social security institutions.  In fact, in a fully
funded DC system,  information is  as critical as the actual funds - a payments  without the correct
information will not be deposited in the workers'  account.  This required an efficient system with a
high level of computerization and transparency.Mexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  38
Long Run Funds for a Thin Financial Market
A major justification for developing a fully funded pension system in Mexico was that it could
contribute significantly to the development of the domestic financial system, which would increase the
efficiency of the allocation of savings, both those generated domestically and those resulting from capital
inflows.  There are two aspects to financial system development.  The first is increasing the diversity of
financial institutions operating in the market,  and the  second is deepening the  market for  financial
securities.  The evidence shows that Mexico has relatively developed markets for government securities,
but that its institutional structure is, like most other major markets in Latin America, bank dominated.
Successful development of Mexico's privately managed mandatory pension system depends on
the implementation of complementary financial market reforms.  Inter alia, reforms to facilitate the
development  of  an  adequate  supply  of  quality  financial  assets  for  pension  funds  to  invest  in.
Accordingly  the  Government  has  initiated  a  number  of  financial  market  modernization  reforms,
including:  (i)  efforts to  strengthen the  banking  system; (ii)  actions to  address  deficiencies  in  the
regulatory and supervisory framework for mutual funds and voluntary pension plans; and (iii) actions
to facilitate the deepening of the insurance market  for the provision  of life and disability insurance
coverage and annuities.
The Mexican strategy of creating mutual funds to manage pension contributions is a necessary
first step in developing broad markets for financial securities because these institutional investors will
potentially be active traders of securities.  The market also is of sufficient size to generate liquidity. The
remaining challenge is to provide adequate incentives for the development of a diverse investor base for
securities. This includes clarification of the legal standing of investors during borrower restructuring.  In
addition, investors must gain confidence that the accounts provided by issuers are sufficiently transparent
to permit a meaningful evaluation of their financial prospects.  Recognizing the importance of account
transparency, the new Mexican Pension System Law allows pension funds to  invest only in securities
rated by  well recognized private rating agencies and  approved by  CONSAR.  This  would provide
incentives for borrowers wishing to access resources from pension funds to improve their accounting and
disclosure standards.
As pension funds expand in Mexico, this will create opportunities to strengthen capital markets
that are not available now.  Mexico has several advantages over other Latin American countries.  First,
the market, with almost 90 million people, is far larger than any other Latin American country except
Brazil.  Second, many Mexican companies had access to U.S. and Euromarket capital markets before
1995.  If these firms can return to these markets, international investors might provide the liquidity
needed to prevent sharp drops in the price of securities that pension funds must sell when an issue's rating
falls below that which is permissible.
Creating mutual funds for pension investment is only a first step towards building deep capital
markets in Mexico.  The Mexican Government is undertaking reforms to encourage the development of
credit performance records and to encourage improved supervisory procedures in the allocation of credit.
It is also reforming the legal structure to protect bondholder rights in restructuring.  As a further step
toward the development of capital markets, the Government needs to encourage the development of
private placement bond and long-term loan markets similar to those used by insurance companies in the
U.S. and institutional investors in Japan.  Developing an annuity market, while an important part of theMexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  39
overall strategy, will have a limited contribution in the near term because of the relatively young age
structure of the population.
Navigating in a Sea of Skepticism
Prior to the initiation of the reform, there was concern regarding the lack of public confidence
and the low level of financial sophistication across a broad spectrum of the population as key factors
hindering the growth of institutional savings.  This stems from a public perception that the government
management of funds or provision of services has been both inefficient and often corrupt.  The public
is skeptical that contributions to government and private savings schemes will result in later benefits to
them.  Instead the public fears that contributions will be used for excessive public expenditures rather
than for investment in  economically viable  and desirable public  projects.  Moreover, the proposed
investment regime for the unique SIEFORE will not help to dissipate this perception, since most of the
pension money will initially be invested in Government debt securities.  In addition, government or
private  savings  schemes  have  often  not  defined  individual  accounts  clearly,  and  the  quality  of
information disclosed to individual savers has been poor, further reducing confidence.
To  address  these  concerns, the  Government  has  initiated  a  public  awareness  campaign to
bolster support for the reform and to encourage participation in the new pension system.  It should be
also  highlighted that  there has been an  extremely positive initial  response to the  new system  - as
demonstrated by the affiliation of over 95% of potential workers by December 1997.
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CONCLUSIONS
The Mexican  reformed pension  system  has  a  basic design  which  creates  the  potential  for
effective income security provision as well as protection against old age poverty, in a manner that is
compatible with both savings accumulation and economic growth.  The reform package established in
1995-96 provides the first real opportunity to shift the old pension system to a defined-contribution
model and  to expand and deepen domestic  capital markets through the creation of  a new class  of
institutional investors.  This is a reality, although in the short-term the impact on capital markets will
be limited by the need to give priority to the security of pension funds' investments.
The  reform  also  provides  for  what  is  likely  to  be  an  irreversible  shift  toward  private
intermediation for the bulk of domestic investible funds.  Private pension funds have the potential to
become the single largest financial industry within a decade.  Their efficiency and investment returns
will  profoundly  affect  the  welfare  of  retirees,  the  savings  rate,  government  finances,  and  the
development  of  capital  markets.  Thus,  further  work  in  this  area  should  focus  on  encouraging
efficiency, economies of scale, and confidence.  Moreover, IMSS will face important competition as a
provider of social insurance services that will increase pressure for further reform of IMSS since failure
to do so will lead to a greater role for private insurance companies
A key feature of the Mexican reform has been the appropriateness of its timing.  The existing
system has a very young age structure and great potential for an increase in coverage.  Furthermore, it
has taken place after the inflationary impact of the eighties and the recent financial crisis, which eroded
the absolute real value of old, pensions, the acquired pension rights of the transition generation, and the
minimum pension established at the minimum wage level.  This means that, provided returns on the
invested contributions are high enough, a significant part of the transition generation will opt for the
defined contribution alternative over the benefits of the old PAYG. This would release the government
from fiscal responsibilities arising from pension liabilities, other than the minimum pension guarantee
for the new affiliates.
Mexico  designed  the  new  pension  system  within  a  difficult  political  and  economic
environment.  The  reform  package  established  in  1995-96  represents  a  radical  reform  effort,
notwithstanding the design  limitations, particularly  its  limited scope to  private  sector workers, the
continued role of the housing  fund component, and  the moral hazard implications  of the  life-time
switch option.  The critical challenges to  ensure the  longer-term success of  the reformed pension
system  will  be  the  improved  financial  performance  of  INFONAVIT,  the  technical  capacity  and
political will of the authorities to enforce the legal and regulatory framework, and the flexibility of the
system to adapt to changing circumstances.Mexico: The 1997 Pension Reform  41
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